During the Cyber Grand Challenge Final Event, one team included a honeypot within most of their "patched" services, fooling some competitors into abandoning working proofs of vulnerabilities to instead attack the honeypot. However, logic within the patched service appears to have contained a flaw, which led to the service crashing.
T he Cyber Grand Challenge (CGC) Final Event (CFE) included "consensus evaluation," in which, whenever a cyber reasoning system (CRS) submitted a replacement service (for instance, to mitigate potential vulnerabilities in the service), the team's competitors were provided a copy of the replacement service prior to the service being fielded. One intent of consensus evaluation was to allow competitors to determine if vulnerabilities were in fact mitigated or simply masked by a reformulation of the service. For example, shifting a stack address might defeat a proof of vulnerability (PoV) crafted for the original version of the service, but it could be compensated for through analysis of the revised service. Consensus evaluation also provided the competitors an opportunity to determine if a patch may have inadvertently introduced a new flaw into the service, and it led some teams to deliberately introduce flaws in to their services.
A team may have chosen to introduce an intentional flaw for one of two reasons. The first reason, broadly anticipated, would be to fool another competing team into adopting their "patched" service. Suppose Team B saw Team A release a new version of service X. Team B may conclude that this version of service X mitigates a vulnerability in the service, leading Team B to deploy that same version. At that point, Team A could then exploit the vulnerability that they themselves had inserted into service X. This strategy of inserting a back door into a service was described by the Shellphish team. 1 The second, less anticipated form of deliberate flaw is a honeypot intended to lure competitors away from pursing actual vulnerabilities.
One of the CFE teams, Deep Red, designed their CRS, Rubeus, to embed a honeypot in most of the replacement challenge binaries (RCBs) that they fielded. The honeypot contained a simple buffer
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overflow vulnerability reachable only while the binary was not executing on the CGC game infrastructure hardware. Several competitor systems created PoVs that targeted this honeypot. And in at least three cases, competitor systems replaced PoVs that were successful in previous rounds with PoVs that targeted the honeypot, but were impotent against the actual vulnerability they had successfully exploited with the abandoned PoV. Had these competitors left the incumbent PoV in place, they would have continued to score.
This article describes the mechanics of the honeypot and the manner in which it was deployed. I identify several cases in which Rubeus's deployment of RCBs appeared arbitrary and detrimental to their score in CFE. Flaws related to their honeypot deployment logic resulted in at least 37 of their 1,422 service rounds having a score of zero. I also describe cases where the honeypot was successful in both diverting the attention of competitors and causing competitors to abandon working PoVs.
In this article, the word competitor refers to the CRS built by each contestant team to autonomously analyze, patch, and prove software vulnerabilities in CGC Challenge Binary services (CBs). CFE CBs are identified by their CGC identifiers, for instance, "CROMU_00065."
Mechanics of the Honeypot
The honeypot created by Deep Red and deployed by their CRS, Rubeus, utilized divergent execution to ensure the service was not vulnerable to the honeypot's buffer overflow when executing on the CGC game infrastructure. The honeypot used the IA32 cpuid instruction 2 to obtain information about the executing binary's host processor. The CGC DECREE execution environment employed a hypervisor during CFE that caught the cpuid instruction and returned a result that was constant. In other words, a binary that executed the cpuid on CGC game infrastructure hardware would always get the same result as provided by the hypervisor. However, if the DECREE execution environment ran on hardware or a virtual machine that lacked the CGC hypervisor, then the cpuid instruction returned a result that depended on the underlying hardware rather than the constant value generated by the CGC hypervisor. Teams could have deployed more robust analysis environments that would not diverge on the cpuid check. As illustrated in Figure 1 , the honeypot branched on the cpuid results, executing the CB service on game infrastructure, and code vulnerable to the honeypot's buffer overflow on all other systems. However, there was a third branch, labeled in Figure 1 as "B," leading from the Check data function. This branch led to execution of null bytes and thus crashing of the service. As will be seen below, this branch was taken many times while executing on CFE infrastructure.
Leading up to the CFE, teams were provided access to the CFE game infrastructure during "sparring sessions" 3 in which each CRS could compete against a simulated adversary, test their APIs, and experiment with strategies. The CGC competition framework developers anticipated that some teams would use this opportunity to fingerprint the underlying hardware platform. Deep Red apparently used a sparring session to record the results of the cpuid instruction, enabling their RCBs to potentially distinguish CGC game infrastructure from other platforms.
Rubeus's Deployment of RCBs
The CFE included 82 distinct services, of which 20 were exploited in the course of the game. Deep Red deployed one or more replacements for 32 of the 82 services. Rubeus deployed multiple versions of some services, in different rounds. Of the 32 services that Rubeus replaced, 28 contained the honeypot in at least one round.
The CFE logs do not suggest much in the way of coherent strategy in Rubeus's fielding of RCBs. In general, services for which Rubeus never deployed an RCB were never scored on. (One CB was withdrawn from the game before Rubeus could deploy an RCB in response to it being scored on.) The converse is not true. Rubeus deployed RCBs for 26 services that were never successfully exploited either by Rubeus or their attackers. For 14 of these 26 services, they deployed multiple different RCBs, in one case (CROMU_00095) churning four different replacements for a service that was never exploited. Note that each time a team replaces a service, that service is down for a full round, giving the team zero points for that service round. 3 All the RCBs that contained the honeypot also included a few other generic defensive strategies, the For several services, the initial RCB deployed by Rubeus was later followed by another change to the service. However, these additional RCBs usually did not include any defensive additions or patches. Rather, they included changes to the initial data that controlled whether the execution path proceeded to the honeypot or the actual service. As noted above and illustrated in Figure 1 , this logic included a third execution path, which resulted in an immediate illegal instruction fault when followed. The second version of an RCB deployed by Rubeus for several services took this fatal execution path for about four rounds (one round to run, the next round to notice trouble and submit a replacement, a round down for consensus, and the final round to deploy the replacement). I could not determine the intent of this third path, though it may be related to functionality that Deep Red alluded to in a postevent interview in which they described a strategy for determining if the expected cpuid result had changed between sparring and CFE.
Why All the Replacement Binaries?
One possibility is that the Rubeus RCB churning resulted from their CRS reacting to attacks against their honeypot. Their CRS did appear to deploy RCBs in response to successful exploits, and their pattern for doing that was not readily discernable from their deploying a different RCB subsequent to an attack on the honeypot. The CGC game infrastructure provided competitors with feedback reflecting whether their services were exploited. This feedback would have reflected successful defense of (or more accurately, the lack of a successful exploit against) the RCBs in question. However, each competitor CRS also received a copy of all network traffic directed at their services, and competitors could ingest this traffic into instrumented instances of their services, for instance, in attempt to detect PoVs. If the Deep Red design deployed these instrumented service instances on platforms that respond "incorrectly" to the cpuid instruction, the CRS might conclude that the RCB had been exploited. In other words, Rubeus might have incorrectly detected opponent PoV success and therefore reacted inappropriately. However, I found no clear evidence that they were reacting to attacks against the honeypot.
Another posited theory behind their RCB churning assumes flaws in logic handling responses to reduction in availability. For example, if one rogue RCB caused degradation in the availability of other RCBs fielded by Rubeus, the CRS might replace those other RCBs with instances measured to have better performance characteristics. While Rubeus did in fact deploy one RCB that seriously degraded scores of other RCBs for two rounds, most of the Rubeus RCB churning was preceded by rounds in which the Rubeus services had perfect or high availability. The CFE logs show no correlation between degraded availability of Rubeus services and their churning of RCBs.
Effectiveness
Only one competitor avoided the honeypot entirely. Two competitors abandoned perfectly good PoVs in pursuit of honey. And the CFE champion attacked the honeypot many times and never did score against an RCB containing the honeypot. Pursuit of the honeypot by Rubeus's competitors did not appear to alter the final team rankings. Determining the quantitative effect on team scores would require speculation as to the effectiveness of PoVs that may have been thrown in place of those thrown against the honeypot, and further speculation as to how Rubeus would have responded to those attacks. To put some of the quantities presented below into context, the CFE had 92 rounds and 82 different challenge sets, with about 15 challenge sets active in each round.
Xandra
Xandra never pursued the honeypot and scored on two Rubeus RCBs containing the honeypot.
Galactica
Galactica abandoned a successful PoV against NRFIN _00063 and, instead, attacked the honeypot for eight rounds. They also abandoned a working PoV against CROMU_00051 and attacked the honeypot for five rounds. Their working PoV for CROMU_00051 would fail against the Rubeus RCB because that RCB included a randomized NX stack as part of its generic defenses. However, the PoV did cause the RCB to execute a retn using a PoV-provided address, which could have led to exploitation of the RCB had the CRS not been distracted by the honeypot.
The game infrastructure provided feedback to each CRS, indicating the success of their PoVs. The Galactica CRS could have used that feedback to determine that attacking the honeypot did not lead to successful PoVs. The fact that the CRS attacked the honeypot in five different services, 30 different times, suggests the CRS did not advantageously respond to the feedback. Other than the successful PoVs that they abandoned, Galactica successfully exploited honeypotted RCBs for CROMU_00065, after scoring against a non-honeypotted RCB for that service (which Rubeus churned five times).
Mechaphish
As illustrated in Figure 2 , Mechaphish abandoned a PoV against KPRCA_00065 that succeeded in two consecutive rounds in favor of an attack on the honeypot for the next five rounds. While other teams repeatedly deployed PoVs that the game infrastructure indicated were impotent, only Mechaphish and Galactica did this after obtaining feedback reflecting the success of previous PoVs against the same RCBs. Mechaphish repeatedly attacked honeypots in three services, and they scored against five other Rubeus services, four of which were honeypotted.
Mayhem (aka Pooh Bear)
Mayhem attacked honeypots in seven services dozens of times. The CFE champion never scored against a honeypotted RCB. The one Rubeus RCB that Mayhem scored against was a service that was never honeypotted. While they repeatedly deployed the same impotent PoVs against honeypots, they also sometimes responded to game infrastructure feedback by frequently deploying several different PoVs against the honeypot for the same service. For example, Figure 3 shows that during 10 rounds of KPRCA_00065, Mayhem deployed six different PoVs, each targeting the honeypot. During those same 10 rounds, Xandra scored, and during two of those rounds, Mechaphish scored before being lured by the honeypot (as previously shown in Figure 2 ).
Mayhem had working PoVs for several of the services for which it targeted honeypots. Given that Rubeus rarely mitigated the vulnerabilities in RCBs, it is likely that Rubeus would have been scored on by Mayhem were it not for the honeypot.
Crspy
Crspy attacked honeypots in three RCBs of two services and repeated the same PoV only once. Crspy never scored on Rubeus. The data for Crspy raises the question of why their CRS attacked the honeypot only a few times. Why would a CRS exhibit a predilection for a honeypot in only a few of the many RCBs in which it appears? 
Jima
This CRS did not appear to deliberately attack the honeypot. Jima did throw a generic prebuilt PoV that would have scored on the honeypot in an RCB in two rounds. The fact that a PoV is prebuilt does not preclude the CRS from determining that the PoV may be effective against an RCB (or at least appear to be). However, Jima threw this particular PoV against most services in most rounds, leading us to conclude that their CRS did not specifically target the honeypot.
Methodology
The CGC infrastructure logs 5 identify which RCBs were fielded by Rubeus and which competitor PoVs were successful against those RCBs. Each Rubeus RCB was analyzed with IDA Pro to identify those containing the honeypot, which was not obfuscated and was the first function invoked by the binary. Identification of which teams targeted the honeypot with a PoV could not be directly derived from game logs, and is less precise. These occurrences were discovered using an analyst replay tool developed as part of the system used to vet competitor software deployed in CFE. 6 This analysis tool was reconfigured to emulate the CGC infrastructure as it would have looked without employing the CGC DECREE hypervisor, thereby causing the honeypot code branch to be taken. In this configuration, the analysis tool replayed each PoV thrown against each Rubeus RCB. However, only one session for each PoV/ RCB pair was replayed, using the session seeds from the first throw of one round in which the pair occurred in the game. Each PoV that succeeded against the honeypot in these trials was assumed to have succeeded in other sessions. This methodology assumes no reliance on randomness in the subject sessions. Analysis of a sample of the subject PoVs suggests they were deterministic (excluding the Jima prebuilt generic PoVs that happened to exploit the honeypot).
T he honeypot successfully lured several competitors, leading some to abandon working PoVs. On the other hand, use of the honeypot significantly affected Rubeus's availability scores due to fielding RCBs whose honeypot logic led to immediate crashes and rounds lost due to the resulting churning of RCBs. The honeypot does not appear to have materially affected the outcome of the competition. Its precise effect on team scores is difficult to determine because we do not know whether CRSs would have deployed successful PoVs in the absence of the honeypot or if Rubeus would have revised its defenses if successfully attacked.
The Rubeus CRS did not appear to include functions to determine if an RCB would fail service polls. Competitors were provided a network tap of all traffic directed at their system. The CGC competition developers expected teams would use this traffic to reproduce service polls to determine if candidate replacement binaries broke service functionality. Had Deep Red implemented this, their CRS might have not deployed so many RCBs (and IDS filters) that failed all service polls, and thus they may have avoided much of the damage due to the flawed honeypot execution divergence logic.
Honeypots in the form of deliberate software vulnerabilities become effective when those vulnerabilities are visible to potential attackers. In the context of capture-the-flag (CTF) competitions, this would require some form of consensus evaluation, which is not often part of CTFs. But for those CTFs that do make team patches available to other teams for review, honeypots could be effective. Regarding real-world network defense, adversaries often have access to the binary code for services run by their intended victims. However, publishing deliberately vulnerable software with the goal of fooling an attacker can also potentially lure an unwitting third party into relying on that same software. That third party may not be aware of the vulnerability or the means of controlling its exploitation.
